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ESSAY
The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-
House: A Critique of a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution
Michael J. Gerhardt*
Upon seeing Niagara Falls for the first time, Oscar Wilde report-
edly remarked that it "would be more impressive if it flowed the other
way." I have a similar reaction to a series of narrow Supreme Court
interpretations of the fourteenth amendment, beginning with the
Slaughter-House Cases,5 decided in 1872, and extending to the 1989
decisions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services4 and DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.5 In Slaughter-
House the Court interpreted the privileges or immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment as merely protecting interests other federal laws
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. B.A., Yale University, 1978; M.Sc.,
London School of Economics, 1979; J.D., University of Chicago, 1982. I am grateful to Kevin Cole,
David Logan, Tracey Maclin, and Ron Wright for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts;
James Blumstein, Robert Martineau, and J. Wilson Parker who have helped to sharpen my under-
standing of this Essay's subject matter; and Jesse Bone, Julie Martin, and Jane Mee for their
diligent research assistance.
1. Munro, Business Managers Can Help Make a Better Society, AM. BANKER, July 21, 1982,
at 20, col. 1 (quoting Oscar Wilde).
2. In pertinent part the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction'
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
4. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
5. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
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already protected, while recently the Court interpreted the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in DeShaney as not imposing af-
firmative duties on the states to protect fundamental rights against pri-
vate violence and in Webster as not requiring the states to expend any
resources to aid women desiring abortions. The link between these cases
is the Court's reluctance to define fully and enforce fundamental rights
against state and private action. This reluctance has reinforced the view
that the Constitution in general, and the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment in particular, primarily provide negative rights,
which require the government to refrain from certain conduct, as op-
posed to positive rights, which impose affirmative duties on the govern-
ment to take actions or expend resources to meet the needs of certain
citizens.6
It is almost second nature for constitutional scholars and historians
to vilify the Slaughter-House Court for lacking the courage and intel-
lectual integrity to give full meaning to each of the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment.7 Slaughter-House rejected the political agenda
6. The distinction between negative and positive rights receives its classical development in I.
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-34 (1969); see also Currie, Positive and Negative Constitu-
tional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986); Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inaliena-
ble Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 330-32
(1985).
7. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 551-53 (2d ed. 1988). Professor
Laurence Tribe commented:
The [Slaughter-House] majority . . . turn[ed] the supposed identity of the fourteenth
amendment privileges or immunities clause and the article IV privileges and immunities
clause on its head .
- The federal government initially had no responsibility for safeguarding [the] rights
[and privileges of the United States citizens.] The proponents of the privileges or immunities
clause sought to delegate to the federal government the power to restrain state interference
with the fundamental personal rights of United States citizens.
Id.; see also Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State Power, 1865-
1873, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 329 (1983). Professor David Currie emphasized a particular difficulty with
Slaughter-House:
[The Court apparently thought] that the sole office of the [privileges and immunities] clause
was to protect rights already given by some other federal law. Apart from the amendment's
less than conclusive reference to dual citizenship, [the Court's] sole justification was that a
broader holding would "radically change[] the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people"-which
quite arguably was precisely what the authors of the amendment had in mind.
Id. at 348 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78); see Curtis,
Privileges or Immunities, Individual Rights, and Federalism, 12 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 56,
59-60 (1989) (criticizing the Slaughter-House Court for ignoring considerable historical evidence
that the framers of the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment intended the
clause to protect "all rights for citizens, constitutional rights, and rights such as freedom of
speech"); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Recon-
struction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 937-38 (1986) (criticizing the Slaughter-House Court for failing to
recognize that the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment shifted complete
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of the fourteenth amendment framers that gave the federal government
plenary power to define and enforce the fundamental rights of all
United States citizens for the sake of a different agenda. Under the new
Slaughter-House agenda, the popularly elected branches of the state
governments retained much of the autonomy granted to them under the
original Constitution to impose upon themselves and to be politically
accountable for the affirmative duties each state preferred. Slaughter-
House left the federal judiciary as the primary protector of the newly
freed slaves from egregious racial discrimination by the states
themselves.
Constitutional scholars and historians have failed to acknowledge,
however, that the modern Court has perpetuated the mistakes of the
Slaughter-House Court through its adherence to a negative rights view
of the Constitution. In the same way the Slaughter-House Court thril-
led the critics of the Reconstruction Amendments,8 a majority of the
Court today has thrilled "federalists"9 by legitimizing state inaction in
the face of private violence as long as the state is not directly responsi-
ble for depriving a person of the resources or freedom necessary to exer-
cise or to defend his or her constitutional guarantees against the
authority to the federal government to protect the fundamental rights of all United States citizens
against state and private action); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 413-14, 420 (criticizing the Slaughter-House Court for
narrowly interpreting the privileges or immunities clause but arguing that the Court may yet be
able to undo its mistake in Slaughter-House to use the privileges or immunities clause, as opposed
to the equal protection and due process clauses, to guarantee federal enforcement of various
unenumerated fundamental rights and affirmative duties). But see Graglia, Do We Have an Un-
written Constitution?-The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 88 (1989) (suggesting that the Slaughter-House Court was not mis-
taken in narrowly reading the privileges or immunities clause thereby preventing the federal courts
from using broad constitutional language to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the states'
rightful authority and reinforcing the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment only to
provide the newly freed slaves with some additional protection against specific discriminatory
practices by the states).
8. The Reconstruction (or post-Civil War) Amendments include the thirteenth, fourteenth,
and fifteenth amendments. For a discussion of the criticism they generated, see generally J. BLUM,
B. CATrON, E. MORGAN, A. SCHLESINGER, K. STAMPP & C. WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 397-98 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE]; Kac-
zorowski, supra note 7, at 939.
9. "[T]he federalist[s] . . . emphasize[] the prerogatives of states (and local governments as
well). [They see the s]tates. . . as somewhat sovereign, somewhat autonomous, and. . . merit[ing]
comity at the hands of the national government." Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1988
and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 884 (1986).
The "federalists" would "plac[e] limits on both Congress and the judiciary." Id. at 885. In con-
trast, the "nationalists" possess a "vision . . . anchored in the supremacy clause and the four-
teenth amendment .... [They see t]he federal courts. . . as the 'primary and powerful' forum for
the vindication of federal rights." Id. (footnote omitted).
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vicissitudes of the private marketplace.'0 These Justices have rejected
the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment they publicly
claim to follow in order to revive "our federalism"" from the judicial
activism of the Warren Court; 2 they pay lip service to the federal gov-
ernment as the primary protector of federal rights while trying to pre-
serve sufficient autonomy and political accountability for the states
selectively to impose affirmative duties upon themselves.'
Tragically, the outrage directed at the Slaughter-House Court has
not been directed at the contemporary Court's use of the negative
rights view of the Constitution as a smokescreen to perpetuate the mis-
conceptions of the fourteenth amendment generated in Slaughter-
House. This Essay, however, challenges the accuracy, as well as the in-
tellectual foundations, of the negative rights view of the Constitution.
For the first time in the literature, Part I traces the origins of such a
view both to the original design of the Bill of Rights and to Slaughter-
House. Part I also demonstrates that the Slaughter-House Court's evis-
ceration of the privileges or immunities clause has made it easier for
subsequent Courts to interpret narrowly the fourteenth amendment to
10. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th
Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989).
11. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). "Under th[is] banner . the Supreme
Court in the past two decades has construed many of the key jurisdictional statutes narrowly,
especially when attempts are made to assert national rights in the federal courts." Logan, Judicial
Federalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. REV. 453, 456 (1987) (citations omitted).
12. The Warren Court is a shorthand reference for the Court from 1953 through 1969 when
Earl Warren was Chief Justice. It is conceded generally that the Warren Court took an activist role
in expansively reading constitutional guarantees and civil rights statutes to protect minorities
against the encroachments of legislatures at the federal and state levels. See generally J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsi, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PuB-
Lic LIFE (1982).
13. See McConnell, Evaluating the Founders' Design (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1511 (1987) (noting that "there has been a revival of interest, across the political spectrum, in
devolution of governing authority to state, city, and community levels" (citations omitted)). It is
difficult to know what a "revival" of traditional notions of federalism might produce. Federalism is
a particularly perplexing topic, as Professor Gerald Gunther in his own characteristically vexing
way puts it:
What are the values, historical and contemporary, of federalism? Can it still be said that
federalism increases liberty, encourages diversity, promotes creative experimentation and re-
sponsive self-government? Or is it a legalistic obstruction, a harmful brake on governmental
responses to pressing social issues, a shield for selfish vested interests? Is federalism a theme
that constitutional law must grapple with simply because it is there, in the Constitution? In
confronting federalism issues, should the Court seek primarily to minimize the obstacles that
the complexities of the federal structure put in the way of meeting modern needs? Or does
federalism embody more appealing values that deserve some of the imaginative enthusiasm
with which modern constitutional law embraces the promotion of such values as equality and
freedom of speech?
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (10th ed. 1980) (emphasis in
original).
SLA UGHTER-HO USE
reinforce a negative rights view of the Constitution. In addition, Part I
demonstrates that the modern Court has perpetuated the Slaughter-
House Court's misreading of the fourteenth amendment by frequently
misusing history to narrow the scope of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by reference to the original understanding of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 14 even though the for-
mer clause may have been an integral part of a scheme to undo radi-
cally the concept of federalism underlying the latter.
Part II explores the significance of rejecting the positive-negative
rights distinction in favor of constitutional interpretation emphasizing
the historical, structural, and linguistic contexts of particular constitu-
tional guarantees. Such interpretation reveals the fourteenth amend-
ment as the most potent source of affirmative duties in the
Constitution. Under this interpretation, DeShaney would have been de-
cided in a radically different way. Such interpretation also demon-
strates that concern about state autonomy in the area of federal civil
rights is misdirected, particularly in light of Congress's plenary author-
ity under the fourteenth amendment to regulate the states to define
and to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. While
such an approach would have left the states with little, if any, auton-
omy in the area of civil rights, that result is precisely what had been
intended by the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments and the
civil rights statutes passed to effectuate them.15 The plan of Recon-
struction was to invest the federal government with plenary authority
to define and enforce the fundamental rights of United States citizens
against state and private action and to leave the states to protect their
own interests in the federal political process.16
14. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "nor shall any person. .. be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in
public accommodations); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (suppressing the Ku Klux Klan);
Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (protecting voting rights); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing Southern
Black Codes). The main civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction legislation are now codified at
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (dealing with conspiracy against rights of citizens); id. § 242 (prohibiting
deprivation of rights under color of law); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982) (granting jurisdiction of civil
rights cases); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (governing equal rights under the law); id. § 1982 (dealing
with property rights of citizens); id. § 1983 (allowing civil action for the deprivation of rights); id. §
1985(3) (allowing damages for the deprivation of rights or privileges).
16. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 7-2, at 548-53 (describing the radical changes the Recon-
struction Amendments effected in federalism); Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 905, 906, 927, 939
(relying on the political and constitutional climate surrounding the congressional debates on the
Reconstruction Amendments and statutes, as well as the debates themselves and the efforts of the
United States Department of Justice and of lower federal courts to interpret and enforce such
laws, to demonstrate that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to subject the states
1990]
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I. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
Current debates regarding the distinction between positive and
negative liberties often begin with reference to Judge Richard Posner's
comment that the "Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties. '17 This comment helped to move the debate about
whether the Constitution provides only negative liberties to where it
could do more damage: from constitutional scholarship to judicial
discourse.18
The debate over the significance of the distinction between positive
and negative rights is part of the even larger debate on the proper rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments with respect to
each other and to individual liberties. To understand better this larger
debate, it is helpful to keep in mind two of the interrelated ways in
which the Framers attempted, prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, to limit the power of the national government. First, the
antifederalists insisted that the Constitution include a Bill of Rights to
limit the powers of and to apply only to the national government.1 9
Fearful of tyranny of the majority, the antifederalists persuaded the
to Congress's complete authority to legislate enforcement of the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment); Logan, supra note 11, at 501-02 (observing that "Congress understood that the [four-
teenth] amendment constricted state power with regard to civil rights as never before" (citation
omitted)); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1455, 1461, 1463-64 (1975) (arguing that the fourteenth amendment granted Congress the
ultimate discretionary authority to subject the states to various private causes of actions, including
damage actions, to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment).
17. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984); see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1225-27 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concur-
ring) (arguing against reading the fourteenth amendment due process clause as imposing an affirm-
ative duty in the circumstances of that case), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998,
1003 (1989); Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
18. In general, rights are political aims that define the relationships between individuals or
groups of individuals and their government. I. BERLIN, supra note 6, at 118-34; R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-91 (1977); Pereira-Menaut, Against Positive Rights, 22 VAL. U.L. REv.
359, 361-62, 374 (1988) (criticizing positive rights as aggrandizing the power of government at the
expense of the electoral process); Tribe, supra note 6, at 330-31 (describing the general characteris-
tics of American constitutional rights). In order for rights to exist in any particular society, govern-
ment must be given the power to enforce them against the government itself, private action, or
both. See generally R. DWORKIN, supra, at 90-94. Rights also tend to be "alienable," in that indi-
viduals who possess them may waive them voluntarily. Tribe, supra note 6, at 330. There are also
rights commonly referred to as "inalienable" negative rights. Id. at 333. These rights are "rela-
tional and systemic" and help to define permanently the relationship between individuals and
their government, and the distribution and character of power within society. Id. at 332-33.
19. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of
Rights did not apply to state governments, but was intended solely as a limitation on the national
government); see also Gerhardt, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law (Book Review), 67
Tax. L. Rav. 393, 406 & n.67 (1988).
414
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federalists to join them in using the Bill of Rights "to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the Courts. ' 20 To achieve these ends, the
Framers phrased the Bill of Rights in largely negative terms.2 The
Framers also included the ninth amendment 22 to prevent any subse-
quent generation from arguing that the Bill of Rights protected only
those fundamental rights explicitly mentioned therein. 3
Second, the Framers built the concept of dual sovereignty into the
Constitution to promote several objectives, including the protection of
individual liberties through the freedom of citizens to move to states
sympathetic to their desires and concerns, the greater ability of citizens
to combat self-interested government at the state rather than the fed-
eral level, and the diffusion or distribution of power between the federal
and state governments.24 Although prior to the Civil War the states had
served as the traditional guardians of life, liberty, and property, and through their
institutions, statutes, and court decisions, defined the status and rights of different
groups of state residents ... [, t]he conflict over slavery forced the nation to...
determine both whether a citizen owed his primary allegiance to the national or
state government, and which of these governments had primary authority over the
status and rights of the individual.25
20. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
21. See, e.g., Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618. Judge Posner initially observed in his judicial writing
that "[t]he Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it
does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a
service as maintaining law and order." Id.; see also Tribe, supra note 6, at 330. Professor Laurence
Tribe explained:
In our constitutional system, rights tend to be individual, alienable, and negative. .... [T]he
rights protected by the United States Constitution-such as the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, or the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law-are ordinarily understood to belong to persons as individuals.
They are also usually understood to be subject to binding waiver or alienation by those per-
sons, and to impose on government only a duty to refrain from certain injurious actions,
rather than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or resources to meet another's needs.
Id.
22. The ninth amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
23. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of James Madison), reprinted
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 399 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1898 (1833), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at
400. Of course, recognizing the ninth amendment as the source of unenumerated rights does not
answer who-the federal judiciary or the states-has the authority to define them. See THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 84, at 434-39 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1987) (citing as one of the major flaws in
attaching a bill of rights to the Constitution that it could be read too easily to exclude rights not
explicitly listed therein).
24. See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1492-1511 (describing the basic reasons for dual
sovereignty).
25. Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 871-72.
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From its inception, the fourteenth amendment has altered radically
the concept of federalism underlying the Bill of Rights.2 6 For every neg-
ative right the fourteenth amendment protects, the power of the federal
courts is increased with a corresponding decrease in the power of state
government. For every positive right that amendment imposes, the fed-
eral courts' power increases with a corresponding decrease in both state
autonomy and resources. From the states' perspective, the situation is
exacerbated by virtue of Congress's power to enact legislation to effec-
tuate the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment and thereby increase
congressional power in ways similar to federal courts at the expense of
state autonomy and resources. After adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, however, no right is protected at the constitutional level,
nor is any fundamental aspect of individual autonomy guaranteed, un-
less the federal government has the power of enforcement.
The Court's concern about the fourteenth amendment's impact on
federalism frequently has led it to treat a broad reading of that amend-
ment with disbelief or hostility. s In its first opportunity to interpret
the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court re-
jected a thirteenth29 and fourteenth amendment attack on a Louisiana
statute that granted to a single company the right to engage in the
slaughterhouse business within an area including the City of New Orle-
ans. The Court emphasized that it did not follow from the primary pur-
pose of those amendments, to secure the freedom of the newly
emancipated slaves, that the framers of the amendments intended to
transfer general responsibility for the protection of civil rights from the
states to the federal government.30 The Court rejected such a broad
reading of the amendments as having drastic "consequences [for] ...
the structure and spirit of our institutions."3' Such a broad reading
26. See generally L. TamE, supra note 7, § 7-2, at 549-50, 552.
27. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[tihe Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
28. Two early post-Civil War decisions indicating that the Supreme Court was anxious to
preserve a considerable degree of autonomy for the states are Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700, 725 (1869) (recognizing the significance of autonomous states by affirming the basic premises
of Republican Reconstruction policy that the reconstruction of the seceded states and their people
constituted a political question to be resolved by the legislative rather than the judicial branch of
the national government), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127 (1871) (holding that
the salaries of state judges were exempt from the coverage of the 1863 national income tax and
concluding that if the instrumentalities of the federal government required tax immunity from the
states for their self-preservation, then those of the states deserved similar exemption).
29. The thirteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]either slavery nor invol-
untary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
30. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
31. Id. at 78.
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would "degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the con-
trol of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally con-
ceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character" and
would "radically [change] the whole theory of the relations of the State
and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments
to the people."32 Thus, the Court found the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not provide general federal
protection for citizens. Rather, the clause only protected rights already
given by some other federal law.3 3 The Court also did not regard the
due process clause as being implicated in any way by the Louisiana
statute.3 As for the petitioners' equal protection clause arguments, the
Court "[doubted] very much whether any action of a State not directed
by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of
their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision."3 5
Yet the radical change in federalism the Slaughter-House Court
rejected was precisely what the Republican drafters and supporters of
the fourteenth amendment intended. As the dissent explained, "It is
objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that
the novelty was known and the measure deliberately adopted ...
Where could it be more appropriately lodged than in the hands to
which it is confided? '3 7 Unlike the majority, the dissenters referred to
the actual legislative history of the fourteenth amendment as the basis
for its understanding that "[t]he mischief to be remedied was not
merely slavery and its. . . consequences; but that spirit of insubordina-
tion and disloyalty to the National government which had troubled the
country for so many years in some of the States."8
Civil rights seemed the obvious place for the federal government to
32. Id.
33. See id. at 79-80.
34. See id. at 80-81.
35. Id. at 81.
36. For comments to this effect in the Congress, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034,
1090 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham); id. at 1055-57 (statement of Rep. William Higby);
id. at 1066 (statement of Rep. Hiram Price); id. at 1262-63 (statement of Rep. John Broomall); id.
at 1832, 1836 (statement of Rep. William Lawrence); id. at 2534-35 (statement of Rep. Ephraim
Eckley); id. at 2942 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Luke Po-
land); id. app. at 99 (statement of Sen. Richard Yates). Several historical studies reach this same
conclusion based on the debates surrounding and the reception given the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. See, e.g., J. KrNEF, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 334-51
(1970); Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMM.
235, 275-77 (1984) (concluding that the fourteenth amendment was intended to empower the na-
tional government to protect the natural rights of its citizens); see also supra note 7.
37. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
1990]
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intervene. As the dissenters noted:
The Amendment was an attempt to give voice to the strong National yearning for
that time ... in which American citizenship should be a sure guaranty of safety,
and in which every citizen of the United States might stand erect on every portion
of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a
freeman.39
While the majority yearned for the original concept of federalism, the
dissent endorsed the amendment's plan to delegate to the federal gov-
ernment through the privileges or immunities clause the complete
power to restrain any infringement-state or private-of the fundamen-
tal rights of citizens of the United States.40 The Slaughter-House ma-
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. The debates on the fourteenth amendment reflect two critical concerns. Most members of
the House of Representatives spoke of the need to remove all doubt about the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, supra note 15, § 1, 14 Stat. at 27, recently passed over
President Andrew Johnson's veto, and guaranteeing against even private action the right to each
person "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id. § 1.
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Frederick Wood-
bridge); id. at 1291-92 (statement of Rep. John Bingham); id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. James
Wilson); id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens); id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. James
Garfield); id. at 2465 (statement of Rep. M. Russell Thayer); id. at 2498 (statement of Rep. John
Broomall); id. at 2502 (statement of Rep. Henry Raymond); id. at 2511 (statement of Rep. Thomas
Eliot); id. at 2530 (statement of Rep. Samuel Randall); id. at 2542 (statement of Rep. John Bing-
ham). To such members of Congress, constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 meant giving
Congress the broad power to guarantee federal redress for any violations of federal civil rights.
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 680
(1979). Despite fervent objections, largely from the Southern Democrats, the amendment over-
whelmingly passed the House. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866). The Senate
debate focused on the substantive scope of the amendment, particularly on whether the privileges
or immunities clause guaranteed any rights above and beyond those already protected by article
IV, § 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 322, 474 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull); id. at
1294 (statement of Rep. James Wilson); id. at 2510 (statement of Rep. George Miller); id. at 2765-
66 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Luke Poland); id. at 3039
(statement of Sen. Thomas Hendricks); see also Curtis, supra note 7, at 56-60 (citing numerous
references by leading Republicans of the era to define the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship as including most of the Bill of Rights and other rights inherent in the notions of
republican government).
The framers of the fourteenth amendment did not have a finely constructed concept of the
scope of state responsibility for the protection of privileges or immunities against private violence.
Consequently, it has been easy for the Court to develop its state action doctrine limiting the pro-
tection accorded to the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment only to unfriendly or hostile state
action. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down the prohibition in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 against racial discrimination by private parties in providing public accommoda-
tions). The evidence, however, indicates the framers understood the states' duty to provide equal
protection of the laws; failure to protect against certain private violence itself denied equal protec-
tion. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 468-70. Messrs. John Frank and Robert Munro argued that the debates on the
Ku Klux Klan Act, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, supra note 15, passed by the Congress pursuant to its
powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, exemplified the scope of congressional power:
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jority's theory, however, was that when the rights of newly freed slaves
were at stake, the amendment should have been read broadly to pro-
vide comprehensive federal protection; but when racial discrimination
was not at issue, the protections of federal citizenship should have been
narrower, and the primary recourse for protection of a state resident's
rights was the resident's own state government.4'
After Slaughter-House the Court could have chosen to revive the
privileges or immunities clause, to invest the equal protection and due
process clauses with sufficient meaning to encompass the guarantees of
the privileges or immunities clause, or to confine interpretation of the
equal protection and due process clauses to their particular contextual
meanings. From Slaughter-House through the early 1950s, the Court
largely chose the third option42 by rejecting the premise of the Recon-
struction Amendments that the federal government should identify and
enforce the fundamental rights of all United States citizens against
state and private action. Instead, the Court during those years "substi-
tuted its belief that civil rights lie within the realm of state power and
that any federal attempt to encroach on that power is to be viewed nar-
Congress [had the power under the fourteenth amendment] to legislate affirmatively in behalf
of a racial group which a state might. . . choose not to protect from actions of private per-
sons .
[A] state denied equal protection when it permitted repeated outrages against one
class in the community . . . [or] when it tolerated widespread abuses against a class of citi-
zens because of their color without seriously attempting to protect them by enforcing the law.
Id.
41. Slaughter-House was not the only case in which the Court ignored the original under-
standing or plan of the fourteenth amendment. Other Reconstruction cases that narrowed the
scope of the fourteenth amendment include United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (hold-
ing that an indictment under the conspiracy section of the 1870 act was defective in failing to
allege that the right claimed to have been violated was one growing out of the claimant Negro's
relationship to the federal government), and United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (declar-
ing void the important criminal conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which had
made it an offense to conspire to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges or immunities under the laws).
42. This trend encountered two significant detours. First, in the 1897 case Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Supreme Court seriously expanded the scope
of the rights that could be enforced by the federal courts against the states. In that case the Court
began the process of selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment
due process clause by interpreting that clause as requiring the states to pay just compensation for
takings of private property. Second, from 1897 through 1937, the Supreme Court frequently struck
down state laws restricting individual liberties on the basis of substantive due process. The apex of
this movement occurred in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and the end effectively came
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). As substantive due process fell out of
favor, the Court returned to the process of selective incorporation it had begun in 1897. See infra
notes 45-47 and accompanying text. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 361-66 (1986); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 11-2, at
772-74.
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rowly and suspiciously."43
The Warren Court then invested both the equal protection and due
process clauses with broader meaning, leading some observers to specu-
late that the controversy over the restrictive meaning given to the privi-
leges or immunities clause in Slaughter-House "has largely [been]
mooted."' 4 The Warren Court, however, only partially achieved the
broad agenda envisioned by the Reconstruction Amendments' framers.
In particular, the Warren Court continued the practice begun by the
Court in 189715 to incorporate selectively, or make applicable to the
states through the due process clause, the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights,46 even though strong historical evidence indicates that the fram-
ers of the fourteenth amendment intended that at the very least the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship would include the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.47 In addition, the Warren and Burger
Courts together found at most only three implied fundamental rights
within the concept of substantive due process, 48 and one, if not two, of
43. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1357
(1952).
44. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448 (1986) [here-
inafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; see also Wilkinson, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 43, 49-50 (1989).
45. See supra note 42.
46. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (recounting the Court's decisions from 1897
through 1967 incorporating most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and holding the sixth amendment right to jury trial applica-
ble to the states through the same clause); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (in-
corporating the fifth amendment prohibition on double jeopardy); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967) (incorporating the sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the sixth amendment right
to a speedy and public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorpo-
rating the fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the sixth amendment right to counsel); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the fourth amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials
any evidence illegally seized).
47. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 56-60 (citing comments by Republican leaders from the
1830s through the 1860s indicating their understanding that the privileges or immunities of na-
tional citizenship included, at the very least, most of the Bill of Rights); see also supra note 40.
48. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality decision) (recognizing
a substantive due process fundamental right to make choices concerning family life arrangements);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a substantive due process fundamental right of
women to have abortions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-507 (1965) (Harlan, J. and
White, J., concurring) (recognizing a limited substantive due process fundamental right of pri-
vacy). These rights were added to those rights previously recognized as being derived from the due
process clause in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (establishing a fundamental right to
teach one's child a foreign language), and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (creating a fundamental right to send one's child to a private
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these rights stands at the brink of extinction.49 Ironically, the Warren
Court's greatest legacy under the fourteenth amendment may have
been its recognition and enforcement of fundamental equal protection
rights, which a legislature has no duty to provide in the first instance
but must be distributed or conditioned on equal terms once the legisla-
ture chooses to provide them. 0 Such rights restrict legislative discretion
less than substantive due process fundamental rights. For all the criti-
cism leveled at the Warren Court from across the political spectrum,51
school).
49. The fate of the fundamental rights to abortion, announced in Roe, and to privacy, an-
nounced in Griswold, are closely interrelated. As for the former, there is no doubt that in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), at least one prong of Roe, the point at which
the state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on abortion, has been
discarded by having been moved, at the very least, to an earlier point in time in the pregnancy.
See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). The Court's decision to
consider three abortion cases for the 1989 Term increased the likelihood the Court would recon-
sider (if not overrule) the other prong of Roe, a woman's freedom to choose abortions as a funda-
mental right. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing whether a
woman's access to abortion services is hampered unconstitutionally by Illinois statutes and regula-
tions that require that abortions be performed in licensed facilities with specified structural, equip-
ment, and staffing requirements), juris. postponed, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989); Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing whether an Ohio law providing a
time-consuming procedure for seeking court permission for abortions and bypassing parental noti-
fication and consent unconstitutionally restricts minors' access to abortion services), prob. juris.
noted, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing
whether a Minnesota law may require a pregnant minor to notify both of her parents at least 48
hours before having an abortion, even if the parents are divorced, unmarried, or barred by court
order from visiting her), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
Assuming arguendo that the Court continues to eviscerate Roe, the next logical target would
be Griswold, on which Roe relied as authority for a constitutionally protected notion of privacy
broad enough to encompass a woman's choice to have an abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Com-
pare Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) with id. at 3072 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down a New
York statute that limited the vote in certain school district elections to owners or lessees of taxable
property, their spouses, and the parents or guardians of children who attended district schools);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down state and federal provisions denying
welfare benefits to individuals who had resided in the administering jurisdictions for less than one
year); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down an Ohio law restricting access to the
ballot for minority parties); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down
a Virginia poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down an Alabama apportion-
ment scheme); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1953) (using the equal protection clause to
require a state to provide counsel for all indigent defendants challenging their criminal convictions
as of right); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536-41 (1942) (using the equal protection
clause to strike down an Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of persos, convicted of two
of more "felonies involving moral turpitude" but expressly exempting from the terms of the stat-
ute offenses such as embezzlement and violations of revenue acts).
51. For criticisms of the Warren Court from the right, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-
ARY- THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUJRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); F. BORK, Tan TEMPTING OF
AMERICA. THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 69-100 (1989); and Meese, The Attorney General's
View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV
701 (1985). For criticisms of the Warren Court from the left, see D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAv"
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the Court never adopted an understanding of the fourteenth amend-
ment as investing the federal government with plenary authority to de-
fine and enforce the fundamental rights of each United States citizen
against both state and private action, which is the kind of understand-
ing required to provide full meaning to the various provisions of the
fourteenth amendment.
52
The significance of the Court's recent decision in DeShaney is that
it is consistent with, if not a return to, the theory of Slaughter-House.
DeShaney is a difficult case to analyze dispassionately because its un-
derlying facts are so tragic.5 3 The petitioner Joshua DeShaney alleged
that he had a substantive due process fundamental right under the lib-
erty component of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to be protected categorically by the county department of social ser-
vices once its agents had become aware that his father had been beating
him. In a majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
did not impose any affirmative duty in general on the county to protect
Joshua, or anyone else, from private violence. 4
There are three noteworthy aspects of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. First, he characterized the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as providing a negative rather than a positive right so that
it could not be interpreted as imposing any duty on county officials to
protect Joshua even in light of their knowledge. To make this interpre-
tation, he narrowed the scope of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the scope of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the former clause
"is phrased as a [negative] limitation on the State's power to act, not as
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); H. CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL (1987); C. MACKIN-
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); and M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
52. See generally Curtis, supra note 7, at 56-60; Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 905, 912; see
also supra notes 36 & 40.
53. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). During
the several years Joshua DeShaney had lived with his father, the child frequently appeared with
severe bruises and injuries allegedly caused by the father. From 1982 through March 1984, the
Winnebago County Department of Social Services routinely investigated whether Joshua was being
beaten by his father. Caseworkers periodically visited Joshua's home, recorded that he appeared
abused, recorded suspicions that he was the victim of child abuse, but did nothing more. In March
1984 Joshua's father beat him so severely that the then four-year-old child fell into a life-threaten-
ing coma and eventually suffered brain damage so severe that he is expected to spend the rest of
his life confined to an institution for the severely retarded. The father subsequently was tried and
convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
which was dismissed in both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit on the county's motion for summary judgment. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
54. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
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a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security."55 He ex-
plained that "its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an af-
firmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests [life,
liberty, and property] do not come to harm through [private] means." 56
Citing his own earlier interpretations of the history of the due process
clause,57 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that history indicated the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments were "intended
to prevent government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression. . . . -5 In short, their "purpose was to pro-
tect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected
them from each other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of
governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political
processes.
59
Second, Rehnquist feared that if the plaintiff had a cognizable
claim under the due process clause federal courts would be flooded with
frivolous litigation and would be able to interfere with the day-to-day
operations of state governments through the exercise of federal court
jurisdiction in every case arguably touching upon a fundamental inter-
est. Accordingly, the majority opted for a bright-line test in DeShaney
to establish a limit on the kinds of due process claims that may be pur-
sued in federal court: unless the states take someone into complete cus-
tody and thereby remove that person's means to defend his or her
rights from private action, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court ignored the interrelationship between what it was saying and the tradi-
tional state action doctrine, which
means that, for the fourteenth amendment to be implicated (and therefore for Congress to
have the power to enforce its protections), there must be either a sufficient degree of state
involvement with the action, or a failure by the state to act in circumstances where the Con-
stitution affirmatively requires action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 246. The notion of positive rights or affirmative duties
displaces the state action doctrine by implicating the government in all deprivations of rights be-
cause the government itself failed to prohibit them. It follows that if the fourteenth amendment
imposed certain affirmative duties on the states to protect fundamental rights against private vio-
lence, as the petitioner argued, then there would not be a state action doctrine. Conversely, if there
is a state action doctrine, as Chief Justice Rehnquist implied, then there would be no affirmative
duties imposed on the states by the Constitution. In DeShaney, however, the Court discussed the
question of affirmative duties as if it were analytically separate from the question of state action,
which it is not. See Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embraces of a
Hypercritical Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990) (suggesting a possible defense of the
traditional state action doctrine overlapping with the Deshaney Court's analysis and defending the
state action doctrine based on reasons similar to those Chief Justice Rehnquist provides for con-
cluding the due process clause does not impose any affirmative duties on the states).
57. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986).
58. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (quoting Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348).
59. Id.
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protect the interests at stake.6
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Rehnquist sought to main-
tain a meaningful role for the states to advance individual interests by
preserving a sphere of state autonomy from overly intrusive federal
courts. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Joshua must look not to
the federal constitution but rather to state law for the proper remedy.
He explained that "[a] State may, through its courts and legislatures,
impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as
it wishes."61 Thus, DeShaney fits neatly into a series of decisions 62 pre-
serving the federal courts only for the most serious or egregious kinds of
due process violations by the states themselves.6
60. The Court recognized that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some re-
sponsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id. at 1005. Citing its earlier decisions in Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982), the
Court explained:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty
that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs. . . it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the county's
knowledge of Joshua's predicament created a "special relationship" in which the government then
had a duty to protect Joshua from further harm. Id. at 1004. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
that "[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." Id. at 1006.
61. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007. He reasoned that the federal courts could have intervened
to protect Joshua only if'the Constitution imposed a duty, which he said it did not, on the state to
protect Joshua from his father's hostile actions. Id. He explained the ultimate remedy in this case
rests with the people of Wisconsin, who have the power to create a state duty to protect against
private violence but who also "should not have [such a duty] thrust upon them by this Court's
expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
62. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; Davidson,
474 U.S. at 344.
63. Both Justices Harry Blackmun and William Brennan wrote passionate dissents. Justice
Brennan explained that his analysis of the case would not begin at the majority's baseline of an
absence of positive rights in the Constitution but with a focus on the action the county actually
undertook in Joshua's case. Under this analysis, "a State's actions can be decisive in assessing the
constitutional significance of subsequent inaction." DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan identified the critical problem in DeShaney as the fact that the
state's investigations led private parties not to pursue any other means of protection against
Joshua's father. He maintained that once certain action is undertaken, the choices (and, therefore,
the liberty) available to someone may change and even narrow. Id. at 1008-09. The government's
duty derives not solely from its knowledge but from its "displace[ment] [of] private sources of
protection and then, at the critical moment,. . . shrug[ging] its shoulders and turn[ing] away from
the harm that it has promised to try to prevent." Id. at 1012. On a more general level Justice
Brennan explained, "[1]f a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it cannof
wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction." Id. at 1009. He read the Court's prece-
dents as "acknowledg[ing] that a State's actions-such as the monopolization of a particular path
of relief-may impose upon the State certain positive duties." Id. Thus, he concluded that "a State
may be found complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the harm."
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A closer examination of DeShaney demonstrates two interrelated
problems with the majority's interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. First, the Court engages in distinctions that
ultimately make little difference and are primarily exercises in seman-
tics. The characterizations of rights as positive or negative mean little
because various constitutional provisions-phrased positively and nega-
tively-impose affirmative duties. 4 For example, the language of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause may be read, as the majority
does, as authorizing the states to remain indifferent to the activities of
private citizens impacting to some degree on important personal inter-
ests unless the state itself has thrust them together involuntarily and
made the deprivation both possible and unavoidable in the absence of
any further intervention. 5 The same clause, however, may be read as
imposing an affirmative duty on the part of the states to avoid complic-
ity with violations of fundamental rights6 or to provide fair procedures
prior to its involvement in the deprivation of someone's "life, liberty, or
property. '6 7
Similarly, the distinction between government action and inaction
Id.
Justice Blackmun agreed that characterization of the government's conduct was at the heart
of this case. He criticized the majority for failing to interpret the fourteenth amendment, consis-
tent with its history, as "designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that
infected antebellum jurisprudence." Id. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He adopted "a 'sympa-
thetic' reading [of the fourteenth amendment], one which comports with dictates of fundamental
justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging." Id.
64. See generally Currie, supra note 6, at 887. Professor David Currie maintained that Judge
Richard Posner's valuable insight that the Constitution protects only negative liberties should not
be taken "as a talisman capable of resolving a broad spectrum of problems against the existence of
governmental duties that can in some sense be deemed affirmative. . . . [I]t would be dangerous to
read too much . . . into the generally valid principle that ours . . . is a Constitution of negative
rather than positive liberties." Id.; see also Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 407 (1966); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968
Sup. CT. REV. 199; Tribe, supra note 6, at 332-35; Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983
Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 1048, 1049, 1064, 1068-72 (1986) (arguing that the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, properly understood, imposes affirmative duties on the
states under certain circumstances).
65. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
66. See id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring three factors be balanced to
determine what process is due); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (explaining
that due process protects property interests, which are defined by state law); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (declaring that procedural due process must be accorded when the govern-
ment intentionally denies a right or a privilege); see also J. ELY, supra note 12, at 18-21; Comment,
supra note 64, at 1049 (maintaining that the Court's procedural due process cases demonstrate
that once a state confers a benefit or service generally and such benefit or service creates a prop-
erty interest, "then the due process clause commands that the state may not withhold . . .[the
benefit or service] without providing procedural protections").
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is of little importance. As the dissent notes, the more pertinent question
is whether the government's action, or inaction, in a particular situation
has had any harmful impact on fundamental rights." From a perspec-
tive aligned with the agenda of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment, it becomes clear that the due process clause may not be as much
about nonfeasance, the failure to act, as it may be about misfeasance,
the failure to act properly.6 9
The second problem with DeShaney is the Court's distortion of the
history of the fourteenth amendment. It is both astonishing and dis-
heartening to witness the DeShaney Court manipulate the original un-
derstanding of the fourteenth amendment due process clause by
construing it in light of the history of the fifth amendment due process
clause.70 The two due process clauses have different histories, different
framers, and rely on different conceptions of federalism. The purpose of
the fifth amendment's due process clause, admittedly, was to limit fed-
eral intervention in the personal lives of United States citizens, but the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to ex-
pand federal power by investing the federal government with complete
authority to require, at the very least, that a state ensures stringently
fair procedures are followed prior to any deprivation of the "life, lib-
erty, or property" of any United States citizen within its boundaries. 71
The inclusion of some language in the fourteenth amendment simi-
lar to that in the fifth amendment is no justification for ignoring the
different agendas of their respective framers. Responsible constitutional
interpretation requires recognition of not only the particular words
shared by different constitutional provisions but also the historical and
structural contexts of particular constitutional provisions. 72 The goal of
constitutional interpretation should be to make sense of a particular
68. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "inaction can be
every bit as abusive of power as action"). Justice Brennan's comments reflect the confusion in the
traditional state action doctrine, however, by focusing on the degree of the state's involvement as
evidence of the state's violation of a fundamental right as opposed to imposing additional liability
on the state based on its failure to prevent the initial violation of a constitutional right by a pri-
vate actor, the father.
69. See Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 916-17 (stating that "[t]he [fourteenth] amendment
required each state to recognize the fundamental rights of every American citizen and to provide
all inhabitants of the United States the protections offered by its codes and common law, and
prohibited the states from infringing fundamental rights or denying any person procedural fair-
ness"); Logan, supra note 11, at 480, 492, 495, 510 (arguing that the indifference or hostility of
state officials to the fundamental interests of United States citizens prompted Congress to pass the
Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights statutes supporting them to ensure plenary authority
in the federal government to protect these interests against the states).
70. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
71. See supra note 52; infra note 73.
72. See Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tax.
L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1989).
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constitutional provision on its own terms as applied to contemporary
society.
The dual purposes of the fourteenth amendment, permeating
through all of its provisions, were (1) to provide constitutional protec-
tion for the fundamental or "God-given" or "natural" rights of all
United States citizens by (2) radically altering the design of federalism
underlying the Bill of Rights to invest the federal government with
complete authority to punish the infringement of such rights by either
state or private action .7  The privileges or immunities clause, lost in
Slaughter-House and never fully revitalized afterwards, constituted an
integral part of these purposes because it was the textual designation of
the nature of the rights the amendment protected and required "a posi-
tive, not a negative, interpretation. " 74
The Reconstruction Amendments purposely used key phrases, such
as "privileges or immunities," "equal protection," and "due process,"
which had appeared time and again in the rhetoric of the reform move-
ment dating back to the early nineteenth century, including the rheto-
ric of the abolitionists and other nationalists who were the victors in the
Civil War and the architects of Reconstruction.7 5 A broad cross section
of Republicans advocated that the fourteenth amendment include
broad language that they (mistakenly) hoped would be explicated later
and clarified by either the federal judiciary or the Congress as the fun-
damental rights enjoyed by free persons in democratic society.78 Just as
73. Commager, Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 14, 24, 26-27 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970); Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 884-90; Soifer,
supra note 40, at 680, 701-02.
74. Commager, supra note 73, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 73, at 24 (em-
phasis added).
75. Id. at 20 (describing the intellectual origins of the language eventually used in the four-
teenth amendment); see also H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968); J.
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 176-79, 181, 188-89, 191-97, 209-11 (rev. ed. 1965); tenBroek, Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and
Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
76. In debates on the fourteenth amendment, most legislators remained silent about whether
the Congress or the federal courts had primary responsibility for defining and enforcing the funda-
mental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. Most of those who did speak took the view
that Congress was the appropriate body for defining privileges or immunities. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham); id. at 1088 (statement
of Rep. Frederick Woodbridge); id. at 1118-19 (statement of Rep. James Wilson); id. at 1152
(statement of Rep. M. Russell Thayer); id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens); id. at
2542 (statement of Rep. John Bingham); id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Luke Poland); see also
Frank & Munro, supra note 40, at 430. Messrs. John Frank and Robert Munro explained that
"[flor historical purposes, privileges and immunities in section 1 cannot be separated from the
enforcement provisions of section 5. It was contemplated that the two clauses together permitted
Congress, as it might see fit by statutes, to apply the Bill of Rights to the states." Id.; see also
infra note 126. The spokesperson for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Senator Jacob How-
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the Slaughter-House Court contributed to the unraveling of Recon-
struction, the DeShaney Court's interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause as only rarely imposing affirmative du-
ties on the states has frustrated the larger scheme to empower the fed-
eral government to protect fundamental rights against both state and
private action. In short, the Court's historiography in recent cases like
DeShaney is inadequate because it fails to account for the desire of the
drafters of the fourteenth amendment to have its various clauses inter-
preted as an integrated whole designed to undo a significant portion of
the concept of federalism underlying the handiwork of the Framers of
the original Bill of Rights itself, including the fifth amendment due pro-
cess clause."7
Judge Richard Posner, whose lower court opinion the DeShaney
Court affirmed,78 has misrepresented the history of the fourteenth
amendment at least as egregiously as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at
the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans from
oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental
services."79 In actuality, "laissez-faire thinking" developed as a response
to undermine the Reconstruction Amendments. Judge Posner is refer-
ring to the critics, rather than the drafters, of the fourteenth amend-
ment. As several prominent historians have observed:
The plea for reconciliation, the let-alone philosophy, and the prevailing disillusion-
ment with high ideals and promises [throughout the antebellum South] . . .had
their effect on the Supreme Court. In a long series of decisions the Court under-
wrote white supremacy, state rights, and laissez faire and virtually nullified the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments insofar as they applied to the rights of
freedmen."
ard, expressed the contrary view that the Supreme Court was the appropriate body to give content
to the privileges or immunities clause. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). He
explained further that the Court likely would follow Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765
(1866).
It was, however, the federal judiciary that ultimately undermined "the congressional Recon-
struction policy." Soifer, supra note 40, at 689. This result should not have been too surprising
given the Court's traditional role in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution and other federal
statutes. See H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUc-
TION ON THE CONSTITUTION 245-81 (1973); see also P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CON-
STITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 54 (1975) (explaining that Reconstruction was
left primarily to the branch "most likely to preserve the law and the Constitution in their tradi-
tional forms-the judiciary").
77. See, e.g., Soifer, supra note 40, at 683, 684, 688-90, 700-04.
78. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987),
afl'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
79. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984).
80. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 8, at 397; see also Soifer, supra note 40, at 701-02.
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Both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Judge Posner's understanding
of the allocation of power between the state and federal governments is
reminiscent of the world view of the Slaughter-House majority. As Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe has described this view:
The nineteenth century legal mind grasped the concept of federalism by visualizing
two coextensive spheres, one defining the power of the federal government, the
other that of the states. Each citizen was subject to two governments, "but there
need be no conflict between the two. The powers which one possesses, the other
does not.. . . The citizen. . . owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak,
and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which each exacts for
disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its
own jurisdiction."8'
Chief Justice Rehnquist has tried to maintain similarly separate
spheres, recognizing that the only "coterminous" junction, when the
federal government does have authority over state governments, is with
respect to egregious violations of clearly defined negative restraints.8 2
A less restrictive reading of the fourteenth amendment by the
Court would have imposed an affirmative duty on the states to develop
common law, construct statutes, or tailor services that protect funda-
mental rights against encroachment from the states themselves or from
private action.' If a fundamental interest is at stake in a particular
case, then the government's responsibility turns on the nature of that
interest.8 The traditional state action doctrine, requiring the involve-
ment, participation, or even complicity of a state as a prerequisite to
the finding of a constitutional violation,85 has negated the use of the
At this juncture, it may be helpful to remember the adage that "[t]hose who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it." G. SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (1929).
81. L. TRIE, supra note 7, § 7-2, at 552 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
550-51 (1876) (emphasis added)).
82. Id. § 7-2, at 553.
83. There is no reason for the traditional state action doctrine once one accepts that the
fourteenth amendment imposes affirmative duties on a state to protect fundamental rights from
infringement by the state itself or by private parties. See Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, .
80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 507, 519-27, 545 (1985) (rejecting the traditional defenses for the state action
doctrine because, in the final analysis, "it requires courts to refrain from applying constitutional
values to private disputes even though there is no other form of effective redress"). Professor Er-
win Chemerinsky primarily based his arguments against the state action doctrine on the decline of
dual sovereignty during the first half of the twentieth century and on the internal incoherence of
the state action doctrine itself. Id.; see also Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The
Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1
(surveying the literature that demonstrates the confusion and incoherence of the state action doc-
trine); Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 383 (1988)
(arguing that there can be no state action doctrine independent of the applicable substantive con-
stitutional law).
84. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "a State may be
found complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the harm"); see also
W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-50 (1919); infra note 88.
85. See supra note 56.
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fourteenth amendment, including the privileges or immunities clause,
as a source of affirmative duties."6
A hypothetical illustration of the validity of this position considers
the result if Joshua DeShaney were black instead of white and if he had
been beaten on several occasions by the Ku Klux Klan rather than by
his father. After Joshua complained to the State, the State had investi-
gated dutifully. Each time the State had arrived on the scene, the Ku
Klux Klan already had beaten Joshua or set his property on fire. Never-
theless, the State assures the hypothetical Joshua that it will continue
to use its resources and enforcement powers to try to protect his rights.
In this hypothetical situation, few should contest that the Court or
Congress could interpret the Constitution as imposing a duty upon the
state to protect Joshua from private violence against his fundamental
rights.8 7 The critical constitutional question raised by the hypothetical
is not whether there is state action, but whether there is a fundamental
right that the fourteenth amendment requires, through judicial inter-
pretation or congressional enactment, the indifferent or incompetent
state to protect against private violence.88 The DeShaney Court's asser-
tion that the state had no duty to protect Joshua makes no sense in
light of the Court's concession that Joshua may have had a fundamen-
tal right, because once that concession is made, the state's duty flows
from the right. Some would argue that the amendment protects only
blacks from racial discrimination by the states.8 " In fact, the amend-
86. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 14-18 (demonstrating that the development of the state
action doctrine coincided with the demise of the fourteenth amendment as a source of positive
rights or affirmative duties and that the traditional state action doctrine's reliance on easily
manipulated concepts such as encouragement or involvement reflects the degree to which it is
ultimately confusing and unworkable).
87. For example, Congress arguably passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) to define, enforce, and
clarify the circumstances under which states had a duty to protect fundamental rights against
state or private action, including the kind undertaken against the hypothetical Joshua.
88. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 507, 535, 550-56 (rejecting the traditional state
action doctrine as unsound and suggesting, as an alternative, focusing on the nature of the right
involved as a guide to the scope of a state's responsibilities in a particular situation); see also
Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 915; Thompson, supra note 83, at 22-23; Tushnet, supra note 83, at
383. But see Cole, supra note 56 (disputing the view that the state action doctrine is incoherent
and unworkable); Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Ac-
tion," 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 558 (1985) (criticizing Professor Chemerinsky's approach, in part, as lead-
ing to a dilution or diminution in individual liberties).
89. Following the Slaughter-House theory, the Court later described the fourteenth
amendment:
[The fourteenth amendment] contain[s] a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctly as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferi-
ority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others en-
joy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.
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ment was passed to empower the federal government to deal with the
problems of discrimination that the Southern States refused to correct
and to guarantee to each citizen of the United States a wide range of
fundamental rights, enumerated and unenumerated, through federal
protection against state and private infringements 0
The lesson of both the hypothetical and the tragedies of the Civil
War and Reconstruction is clear even if it has escaped both Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Judge Posner: the nature of a state's constitutional
duty turns on the fundamental right at stake. Once the duty is identi-
fied, of course, analysis still must identify whether it was breached. 1
Part II of this Essay demonstrates more fully that the scope of the du-
ties the fourteenth amendment imposes on the states depends not on
the extent of the state's involvement in an infringement of a fundamen-
tal right but on the nature of the rights the fourteenth amendment has
required the state to protect.
The DeShaney Court's reluctance to fully enforce fundamental
rights by requiring the states to discharge affirmative duties leads the
Court into an additional problem: its demonstration of the limits and
particularly the lack of predictability of representation-reinforcement
theory. This theory "justifies judicial intervention either to eliminate
the failures of the political market so that it would work properly in the
future or, more controversially, to mimic the results that would have
occurred had the political market been operating properly." 92 Represen-
tation-reinforcement theory rejects the authority of federal courts to
search for unenumerated rights in the Constitution. It is strictly a pro-
cess-based theory that supports judicial intervention to eliminate struc-
tural or procedural obstacles preventing powerless or unrepresented
minority segments of our society from full or systematic participation in
the political process as if it were a town meeting.93
DeShaney is consistent with representation-reinforcement theory
in that it rejected the existence of any positive fundamental right re-
quiring the state to act under the circumstances of the case. The major-
ity left the protection of Joshua DeShaney's interests to the political
processes of the state. The majority necessarily found no problem in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879).
90. See Gressman, supra note 43, at 1329-33 (summarizing the evidence indicating the fram-
ers designed the fourteenth amendment to protect fundamental rights against both state and pri-
vate infringement); see also Kaczorowski, supra note 7, at 911-13; supra note 40; infra note 138.
91. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (stating that § 1983 "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions"); see also Comment, supra note 64, at 1061.
92. M. TUSHNET, supra note 51, at 71.
93. See generally J. ELY, supra note 12, at 135 (discussing the need for the Court to facilitate
representation of minorities).
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how children such as Joshua were treated in the state political process;
they implicitly accepted that Joshua and others in a like situation had
not been excluded unfairly or systematically from consideration by the
state legislature.94
The representation-reinforcement theory might have reached a
contrary result, however, by imposing a stricter duty on government to
provide Joshua fairer procedures to defend his own interests prior to
the state's approving custody with his father. Fairer procedures would
have allowed Joshua a remedy without even requiring the Court to
identify any fundamental right. The Court could have resorted to the
historical understanding of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause (separated, if possible, from the rest of the fourteenth amend-
ment) as guaranteeing "that the government should not be able to in-
jure you, at least not seriously, without employing fair procedures." 5
The drafters of the fourteenth amendment due process clause under-
stood the term "liberty" in the clause as "'also involv[ing] civil rights;
i.e., the absence of inequitable governmental interferences with private
pursuits.' ,9 In addition, Blackstone, whose definition of "liberty" has
often been used to support a restrictive reading of the clause, defined
"life" as "the right of personal security [that] consists in a person's le-
gal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation. '97 The historical understanding of the due
process clause at the very least would impose stricter duties on the
states to ensure fair procedures have been followed prior to any depri-
vations of the interests covered by the due process clause.98 The proce-
dures appropriate for any particular case will vary with the seriousness
of the injury and the procedures that would be feasible under the
circumstances.99
Joshua's custody case presented a tragic conflict between a father's
and a son's interests. The system, however, could have accorded better
"due process" to Joshua if once he had demonstrated the extent and
repetitiveness of his injuries the state had allowed Joshua to shift more
easily a presumption against his father. Such a shift in presumption
would have required the father to forfeit custody unless he could show
he had not beaten Joshua or he was cured of his propensity to abuse his
94. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989).
95. J. ELY, supra note 12, at 192 n.28.
96. Id. (quoting H. HYMAN, supra note 76, at 447).
97. Id. at 192 n.28 (quoting Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Con-
stitutional Tradition, in DuE PROCESS: Nomos XVIII, at 3, 7 (J. Pennock & J. Champan eds.
1977)).
98. Id. at 18-19.
99. Id. at 19.
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child physically.100
DeShaney is but one example of the Court's attempts during the
past decade to perpetuate the notion initially derived from Slaughter-
House that the states do not have any affirmative duty to facilitate the
exercise of a fundamental right against state or private infringement.
Indeed, DeShaney relied heavily on the 1980 decision in Harris v. Mc-
Rae.101 In Harris the court upheld the power of Congress to fund some
medical services to the poor but not abortion on demand.'0 2 Congress,
however, had taken childbirth for the same poor women off the private
market by funding the necessary medical care within a comprehensive
medical benefits program. The Court distinguished between direct gov-
ernmental interference with a woman's freedom to choose and indirect
deterrence of the abortion choice resulting from government's decision
to pay for health care related to childbirth but not to provide analogous
support for the same woman if she chooses to have an abortion. The
Court did not wish to impose any affirmative obligation on the part of
Congress to fund abortion on demand. Justice Stewart characterized
the funding restrictions as "plac[ing] no obstacles-absolute or other-
wise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.' ' 0 3 The Court ex-
plained that Congress was not responsible for a poor woman's inability
to pay and that Congress's decision to subsidize only childbirth "may
have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing
the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there."'1
Webster naturally followed from Harris and, frankly, from a major-
ity of the Court hostile to fully protecting fundamental rights, particu-
larly unenumerated ones such as the fundamental right of women to
choose an abortion as announced in Roe v. Wade. 0 5 In Webster a splin-
tered majority gave the states far greater powers to limit abortions by
upholding Missouri regulations that prohibited the use of public facili-
ties or employees to perform abortions and the use of public funding to
support abortion counseling, and that required physicians to determine,
when possible, whether a fetus at least twenty weeks old is capable of
surviving outside the womb. 06 The majority relied on both DeShaney
100. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (describing the hearings held to determine
Joshua's custody even after evidence of his father's beatings had surfaced).
101. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)).
102. Harris involved the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which required govern-
ment expenditures for childbirth, but not abortion, for poor women. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 301.
103. Id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
104. Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
105. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). Chief Justice Wil-
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and Harris to hold that "the State[s] need not commit any resources to
facilitating abortions .... Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that the Missouri regulations placed "'no govern-
mental obstacle[s]'" in the path of women seeking abortions, thereby
"leav[ing] a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had
chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all."108 Following the same
reasoning he had used in DeShaney, Chief Justice Rehnquist inter-
preted the fourteenth amendment due process clause as preserving an
important sphere of state autonomy to deal with the abortion issue:
"[T]he goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove inexo-
rably 'politically divisive' issues from the ambit of the [states'] legisla-
tive process, whereby the people through their elected representatives
deal with matters of concern to them."109
liam Rehnquist and Justices Byron White, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony
Kennedy joined in construing the preamble to Missouri's statute as expressing only a value judg-
ment that "'the life of each human being begins at conception,' and that '[u]nborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.'" Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3049 (quoting Mo.
REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1), (2) (Supp. 1989)). These five Justices also upheld the Missouri regulations
prohibiting the use of (1) public employees or facilities to perform abortions unless the life of the
mother was put at risk by carrying the baby to term; and (2) public funding to encourage abor-
tions. Id. at 3050-54. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy joined in a separate
plurality opinion that rejected the trimester framework announced in Roe for determining at what
point the state's interest in protecting life became compelling, but left untouched Roe's other pro-
nouncement that women had a constitutionally protected fundamental right to have abortions.
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). In a separate concurring opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor explained how Missouri's regulations did not constitute an "undue burden"
on women's fundamental right to have abortions, that Webster did not require the Court to recon-
sider Roe's holdings that women had such a fundamental right, and that at the point of viability
the state had a compelling interest to regulate, if not prohibit, abortions. Id. at 3058-64 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In strident language, Justice Scalia de-
clared that the majority should have found that Webster presented the appropriate occasion to
overrule Roe's holding that women had a constitutionally protected fundamental right to choose
abortions. Id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
107. Id. at 3052.
108. Id. (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 315).
109. Id. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). On behalf of himself and Justices
Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, Justice Harry Blackmun declared that the majority had
gone further than necessary to eviscerate Roe. He first argued that the Missouri regulations, in-
cluding the preamble to the Missouri statute, plainly violated the constitutionally protected right
of women to have abortions as announced in Roe. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He demonstrated that the Missouri regulation requiring testing for viabil-
ity could have been upheld without overruling any aspect of Roe. Id. at 3069-71. He also defended
the trimester approach spelled out in Roe, id. at 3075-76, and criticized the standard the plurality
used to displace it, which would uphold any regulation of abortion if it "'permissibly furthers the
State's interest in protecting potential human life.'" Id. (quoting the plurality opinion). Lastly, he
lamented the plurality's approach to Roe, which "[b]y refusing to explain or to justify its proposed
revolutionary revision in the law of abortion, and by refusing to abide not only by our precedents,
but also by our canons for reconsidering those precedents,. .. [would] invite[] charges of coward-
ice and illegitimacy to our door." Id. at 3079. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented to the Court's
limitations on Roe on the ground that both the preamble and the Missouri regulations violated the
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The federal or state government's decision to remain "neutral"
with respect to abortion by not funding either childbirth or abortion
leaves the decision for women on abortion to the private marketplace,
which would allow only wealthy women to exercise their fundamental
right to choose an abortion.' 1 0 As long as a woman's choice regarding an
abortion continues to be treated as an inalienable right,"' however, the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at 3082-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
110. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that government may not remain neutral with respect
to abortion funding because government's very neutrality reinforces the obstacles the private mar-
ketplaces have placed in the path of poor women seeking to exercise their inalienable rights to
have abortions. Tribe, supra note 6, at 337-40; see also Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1300-01 (1984) (analyzing
government's allocation of sanctions impacting on individual liberties through (1) determining
whether the government has made an offer to expand the choices available to individuals or a
threat to make a citizen worse off as the result of exercising a constitutional right, and then (2)
recognizing that constitutional constraints should be imposed on threats but not on offers unless
the offers are designed to discourage the exercise of inalienable rights). But see Sullivan, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1418, 1421 (1989). Professor Kathleen Sullivan identi-
fied the following three approaches to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: (1) rejecting the
doctrine outright given that the parties burdened are free to accept or reject the conditions and
that the government is free to grant or withhold benefits as it sees fit; (2) accepting the doctrine
with the understanding that it may not be used to alienate so-called inalienable rights, including
"strong constitutional rights against governmental regulation and redistribution of property [that
otherwise] would check the state from squandering achievable social wealth", id. at 1418; and (3)
applying the doctrine strongly in light of concerns regarding the preservation of a realm of "private
autonomy from government encroachment . . . the maintenance of government neutrality or
evenhandedness among rightholders, [and] the prevention of . . . discrimination among
rightholders who would otherwise make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of their rela-
tive dependency on a government benefit," id. at 1421.
111. Webster is the most recent in a series of decisions in which the Court has had to defend,
reconsider, or clarify the constitutional right it first recognized in Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down
Pennsylvania abortion regulations that a woman receive abortion-discouraging information 24
hours before she can consent to an abortion, that the abortion technique used after viability pro-
tect the life of the fetus, or that a doctor file a detailed public report before each abortion); Simo-
poulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (holding that a state regulation requiring that second
trimester abortions be performed in licensed outpatient clinics is not an unreasonable means of
furthering the state's compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of the woman);
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (invalidating a Missouri statute requiring
that all second trimester abortions be performed in a "hospital" on the ground that it unreasona-
bly infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion, but upholding statutes
requiring a pathology report, requiring the presence of a second physician during abortions per-
formed after viability, and requiring minors to secure parental consent); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding unconstitutional city ordinances re-
quiring all abortions for women more than three months pregnant be performed in a hospital,
imposing a 24-hour waiting period between the signing of an abortion consent form and the medi-
cal procedure, and requiring doctors to tell women seeking abortions that a fetus is a "human
life"); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (ruling that states may require doctors con-
sulted by girls still dependent on their parents and too "immature" to decide such matters for
themselves to try to inform parents before an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(upholding the Hyde Amendment, which permits Medicaid money to pay only for abortions to
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:409
decisions by Congress in Harris and by the State of Missouri in Web-
ster violate the equal protection clause because they make childbirth
more attractive and more accessible than abortion for poor, pregnant
women. These governmental choices, derived as much from hostility to
sexual freedom for women as from a desire to protect unborn life, tend
to force poor women to weigh their particular choices between an abor-
tion and childbirth involuntarily in favor of the option the government
prefers. By offering services that aid childbirth but not abortion, the
government compounds any inequities or difficulties the private mar-
ketplace already may have placed in the path of poor women seeking
abortions. In other words, the government's intervention in both Harris
and Webster does not provide poor women with the same choice facing
wealthy women who are pregnant but rather exacerbates whatever
alienation of poor women's inalienable rights to abortions the private
marketplace already has effected. As one constitutional scholar has ob-
served, "When the ... government has agreed to finance [or otherwise
support a poor] woman's . . .costlier choice of [childbirth] . . ., no
concern for conserving that government's limited [financial] resources
could justify withholding the funds that a safe abortion would re-
quire.""' 2 Government needs a compelling justification for interfering
with or discriminating against the exercise of a fundamental right, but
the government had no such compelling justification in Harris."13
save a pregnant woman's life); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (suggesting that states may be
able to require an unmarried minor to obtain parental consent to an abortion, as long as state law
provides an alternative procedure to parental consent); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)
(reaffirming the Court's intention to give doctors broad discretion in determining when a fetus can
live outside the womb); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (ruling that states have no legal obliga-
tion to pay for "nontherapeutic" abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(holding that states cannot give husbands veto power over their wives' decisions to abort their
pregnancies and that parents of minor, unwed girls may not have an absolute veto power over
abortions); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down restrictions on facilities that could be
used to perform abortions).
112. Tribe, supra note 6, at 338 (footnote omitted).
113. Id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 110, at 1486-90 (arguing that the reasoning undertaken
here, to critique Harris and even a broader range of cases involving governmental conditions and
benefits influencing the ways that citizens choose to exercise certain individual liberties, does not
explain as fully as her own theory of why it is bad for government to get involved in such cases).
But see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (suggesting the state
may have a compelling interest in protecting human life once it has been conceived). Professor
Kathleen Sullivan is mistaken to the extent that the approach undertaken here and elsewhere, see
Tribe, supra note 6, does explain that government's involvement in unconstitutional conditions
cases must be scrutinized strictly because government possesses the unique and unparalleled abil-
ity to restructure public and private spheres such that certain classes of rightsholders may be
worse off, or at least less able to defend their choices and rights, once the government has become
involved. Nevertheless. Professor Sullivan provides a fuller explanation of the pernicious effects of
governmental redistribution of choices or rights belonging to individuals and groups. See Sullivan,
supra note 110, at 1489-90. Even if the Court had found the funding schemes in Webster and
Harris to violate the equal protection clause under the reasoning urged here or by Professor Sulli-
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Webster also demonstrates, like DeShaney, a misapplication and
misunderstanding of representation-reinforcement theory. Speaking on
behalf of himself and Justices Byron White and Anthony Kennedy,
Chief Justice Rehnquist defended the Court's expansion of the ability
of the states to regulate abortions by observing that women are more
than adequately able to protect their interests in the political process
because they currently constitute "more than half of [the Nation's]
population . *.". ."" The critical question under representation-rein-
forcement theory, however, is not whether the group claiming it has
been excluded from the political process could be represented theoreti-
cally in that process but whether that group, in fact, has been excluded
structurally or systematically in the past from meaningful participation
in designing the law under consideration. 1 5
II. "THE ROAD NOT TAKEN""16
The road not taken by the Supreme Court, from Slaughter-House
through like-minded decisions such as DeShaney, has been to embrace
a broad enough reading of the fourteenth amendment to have shifted
plenary authority to the federal government to protect the fundamental
rights of all citizens of the United States against state or private action.
The first step down this road is the rejection of the distinction between
positive and negative rights as a not very helpful label to explain fed-
eral-state relations in the post-fourteenth amendment world or the ac-
tual range of constitutional provisions imposing affirmative duties. Such
duties derive from various sources, including but not limited to the lit-
eral provision of a positive right, 17 the government's monopolization or
displacement of the resources necessary for the exercise of an inaliena-
ble right,"18 and the government's direct placement of someone in a po-
van, the state would have been left with various political options. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 341-
42.
114. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
115. See generally Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 201, 245-
47.
116. R. FROST, The Road Not Taken, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST (E. Lathem ed. 1969).
117. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence"). The sixth amendment provides several guaran-
tees to defendants:
[The right to] enjoy . .. a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . .. and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. amend. VI.
118. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 6, at 333-35; see also Currie, supra note 6, at 880-86.
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sition of danger.1 '
Of particular interest about such strange bedfellows as Professors
David Currie, Robert Kaczorowski, Philip Kurland, and Laurence Tribe
is their uniform agreement that the most potent source of affirmative
duties in the Constitution is the fourteenth amendment itself. 20 The
framers intended the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment to invest the federal government with complete authority
to identify and to protect, in both the courts and the Congress, the fun-
damental rights of all citizens of the United States.2 Although the
Court has rejected such a broad reading as early as Slaughter-House,
its own interpretations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment require the states to distribute and condition services on
equal terms'22 and to punish private discrimination if the government
itself has taken action to facilitate such discrimination.2 3
119. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06
(1989). Professors Laurence Tribe and David Currie have identified several constitutional provi-
sions imposing affirmative duties on government as a result of the plain language of the Constitu-
tion or of the Court's interpretation. For example, Professor Tribe identifies at least four duties
the Constitution explicitly imposes on government: (1) the sixth amendment guarantee of "Assis-
tance of Counsel" to all criminal defendants, U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; (2) the membership require-
ment for the House of Representatives, which provides that the House "shall be composed of
Members chosen. . . by the People of the several States," id. art. I, § 2; the republican guarantee
clause, which requires that the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Re-
publican Form of Government," id. art. IV, § 4; and the accounting clause, which mandates that "a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time," id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Tribe, supra note 6, at 332. Professor Tribe adds
the funding of abortions for poor women as an example of another affirmative duty imposed on the
government by the fourteenth amendment requirement that the government avoid conditioning
inalienable rights to facilitate their alienation. Id. at 337-40.
Professor Currie provides an even more exhaustive list of constitutional guarantees imposing
affirmative duties on government, including: (1) the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which the Court has interpreted as requiring the government (a) to provide a claimant cer-
tain procedures, including hearings, prior to the termination of welfare benefits to which state law
indicated the claimant had an entitlement, and (b) to take affirmative steps to guard employers
from private acts of violence; (2) government's general duty under the Constitution to provide
judicial remedies for the government's own constitutional violations; (3) the contracts clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 10, which the Court has interpreted as requiring the government to continue to
offer remedies for the protection of private contract rights once the government has made such
remedies available; (4) the government's obligation under the first amendment to make public
property available under certain circumstances for speaking; and (5) the equal protection clause,
which the Court has interpreted as requiring the government to condition or to offer services on
equal terms, to provide legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants appealing their convictions
as of right, and to take action when necessary to avoid facilitating private discrimination. Currie,
supra note 6, at 872-86.
120. See supra note 7; see also supra note 64.
121. See supra notes 7, 36, 40 & 76; infra note 126.
122. See supra note 50.
123. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (prohibiting the state from enacting a
constitutional provision forbidding the adoption of fair housing laws); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding the state responsible for discrimination by a private firm
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On occasion the government also must take actions and expend re-
sources to avoid certain foreseeable consequences that would violate
negative guarantees in the absence of such actions or expenditures. For
example, as a result of the fourteenth amendment's making both the
fourth12 and fifth125 amendments applicable to the states,'26 the Con-
stitution imposes an affirmative duty on government to provide mini-
mal police training. While the Constitution does not impose the duty on
local governments to provide a police force in the first instance, once
they decide to provide such a service, the fifth amendment requires that
the police be trained to provide warnings that comply with Miranda v.
Arizona,27 and the fourth amendment requires the police to be trained
at a minimum to use deadly force only as Tennessee v. Garner12 8
dictates. 9
It is not possible, however, to square a broad understanding of the
fourteenth amendment with the negative rights view of the Constitu-
tion, which equates restrictive constitutional language with negative
rights and that narrowly reads the history of the fourteenth amendment
to check the power of the federal government over the states in the area
that bad leased state property); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting the state from
enforcing a racially restrictive covenant as it would enforce any other covenant).
124. The fourth amendment guarantees in pertinent part that "[tihe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125. See supra note 14.
126. Two prominent proponents of the view that the fourteenth amendment incorporated
the Bill of Rights were Rep. John Bingham, a principal draftsman of § 1 of the amendment, and
Sen. Jacob Howard, who introduced the amendment in the Senate but who disagreed with Rep.
Bingham on whether the privileges or immunities clause incorporated rights in addition to those
protected in the Bill of Rights. For example, Rep. Bingham maintained that "the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. John Bingham); see also id., 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1868) (statement of Rep. John Bingham). In an earlier debate upon the
amendment in the form in which he first proposed it to Congress, he explained its purpose as
"simply ... to arm the Congress ... with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in
the Constitution today." Id., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866). Sen. Howard maintained that not
only did the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment include the privileges
and immunities contained in article IV, § 2 of the Constitution, as described by Justice Washing-
ton in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), but also "[t]o these
privileges and immunities ... should be added the personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). Sen. Howard explained that he was presenting the views of a
majority of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Id. at 2764-65. See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 7, § 11-2, at 772-74.
127. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
128. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
129. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 n.10 (1989); see also Gerhardt, The
Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section
1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 572-73 n.157 (1989).
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of civil rights. A broad reading of the fourteenth amendment depends
on interpretation that honors its historical context, as discussed in Part
I of this Essay, as well as its structural and linguistic contexts.
Although the contours of the privileges or immunities clause are a
challenge to define, 130 DeShaney illustrates the ways in which it, or the
due process clause, could have been interpreted to uphold federal impo-
sition of an affirmative duty. First, Joshua arguably had a fundamental
right to life derived from the concept of ordered liberty critical to the
maintenance and quality of a free society. Such a right also may have
been protected under substantive due process and reflects part of the
broad agenda of the framers of the fourteenth amendment." 1 Second,
Joshua arguably possessed a fundamental right to liberty in order to
move about at will that derived from the historical understanding of
the fundamental rights of free citizens. 13 2 Third, it is possible to argue
that Joshua had a property interest, alternatively protected by the due
process clause, based on the state's delivery of certain services to
Joshua and its repeated interventions in Joshua's circumstances that
(1) created the promise that he would suffer no harm, on which Joshua
130. See Kurland, supra note 7, at 420 (suggesting that the privileges or immunities clause is
the logical constitutional guarantee to limit "legislative and executive discretion. . . on such mat-
ters as public education, public welfare, and public housing; police, fire, and sanitation; ecology;
and. . . privacy"); Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 76-82 (1989) (suggesting
that judges may interpret the privileges or immunities clause in a principled fashion by under-
standing that the federal judiciary need not be the final word on its meaning and by referring to
the traditions or "deep understandings" that define the nature of our society); see also Comment,
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 142, 189-90 (1984).
131. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 6, at 870 (observing that German courts interpreted their
version of the Constitution's due process clauses as requiring the state to prohibit abortions:
"[they] interpreted a provision recognizing a right to life against government as imposing an af-
firmative duty to protect life from menaces not of the government's making"). Professor Laurence
Tribe has written:
But for its biological dependence on the woman, it is at least arguable that the fetus could be
regarded as a holder of rights under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, as well as the equal protection clause of the latter. Any such "right to life"
could hardly be deemed alienable by the unborn or on their behalf. The inalienability of that
right suggests that the government bears an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the
fetus to the extent that it may do so without coercing involuntary pregnancy. Thus, an obliga-
tion may well arise on the part of government to take affirmative action to minimize the
underlying conflict and thereby protect the interests of the fetus as well as the freedom of the
woman.
Tribe, supra note 6, at 340-41 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
This apparent conflict between affirmative duties to protect both the woman and her fetus in
the abortion context could be resolved by retaining the viability test set forth in Roe but treating
antiabortion laws as a form of gender discrimination. See L. TRME, supra note 7, § 15-10, at 1353-
58.
132. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1009-10
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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relied to his detriment, and (2) implicated a duty on the part of the
state to prevent any further harm.133 If there were any such federal
rights present in this case, then the state should have been aware that
each time it left Joshua in the custody of his father, it increased the
possibility that Joshua's fundamental rights were going to be deprived
while correspondingly discouraging Joshua or his friends from pursuing
remedies through any available private channels. 13  The state's aware-
ness represents the degree to which the state contributed to, or failed to
protect against, a private actor's violation of a fundamental right de-
rived from the fourteenth amendment.
135
Among the kinds of racial discrimination the framers of the four-
teenth amendment sought to eliminate were state laws and courts hos-
tile to the fundamental interests of the citizens of the United States.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment understood from first-hand
experience that the states could discriminate invidiously against the
beneficiaries of Reconstruction, specifically blacks and those seeking en-
forcement of a wide variety of fundamental rights, through the Black
Codes, 36 the discriminatory enforcement of racially neutral laws, 137 and
the failure to take action against private violence that threatens funda-
mental rights.138 Even after the fourteenth amendment's adoption, state
courts persisted in developing certain doctrines that could be used to
frustrate the important personal interests of United States citizens, in-
133. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 64, at 1066-67.
134. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Of course, this approach may be another way of saying there was a "special relation-
ship" triggering an affirmative duty. See Comment, supra note 64, at 1061. It is important to
understand the state had an affirmative duty in DeShaney by virtue of the fundamental right and
the threat of private violence against it. Even if one were to accept that the state had an affirma-
tive duty in this situation, the petitioner still faced at least two other problems under § 1983. First,
the petitioner would have had to show the appropriate state of mind for a violation of the due
process clause. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986),
and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)). Second, the petitioners would have had to show
causation. Under current law, however, the petitioners probably could have shown factual causa-
tion. Even though the father's behavior could be characterized as a superceding cause, the peti-
tioners could have argued there is proximate cause because the state could have foreseen the harm.
Indeed, the state represented itself as being especially qualified to perceive this kind of harm,
particularly by its agents trained to identify and remedy it.
136. These racially restrictive laws, also called the Slave Codes, were designed to limit the
effect of emancipation. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1143-44 (1977).
137. Id. at 1150-53.
138. Congress was well aware of the private violence against the freed slaves and Unionists in
the South as well as discriminatory laws in some states (for example, Oregon and Indiana) outside
of the South. See Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 462, 474-75 (1982); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 31 & n.57, 32 & n.58 (1949); Kennedy,
Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 521, 533 (1989).
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cluding the newly freed slaves and their descendants and supporters.
These doctrines, which apply once the Court fails to identify an interest
as a fundamental right or a fundamental right that does not impose any
affirmative duty of protection on the states, include: (1) sovereign im-
munity;13 9  (2) the public duty rule;140  (3) the rules of proximate
cause;'I and (4) limits to full recovery in damages. 42 After the demise
of the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment in
Slaughter-House, it has become harder for the Court to justify the rec-
ognition and enforcement of the fundamental rights of all citizens of
the United States against these potentially pernicious doctrines. Con-
versely, it has become easier for the Court to read other constitutional
provisions such as the fourteenth amendment due process clause to ex-
clude any unenumerated rights, thereby leaving the states free to use
these same four doctrines to frustrate arguably fundamental rights.
The fate of Joshua DeShaney in the federal courts is testimony to
this last point. For example, the DeShaney majority decided that, as
long as no affirmative duty was involved, the four doctrines used by the
states, including their courts, prior to adoption of the fourteenth
139. In general, sovereign immunity refers to the protection the state and federal govern-
ments enjoy from legal actions. Sovereign immunity "is associated with the idea that 'the King can
do no wrong."' W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 1033 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
140. "The public duty doctrine ... holds that some unspecified duties are owed only to the
public and that private individuals have no redress for their violation ... Id. at 1049 n.81
(citations omitted).
141. Proximate cause is a term of art referring to the legal responsibility of a defendant for
an injury of which he or she may already have been found to be the factual cause. "The term...
is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even
where the fact of causation is clearly established." Id. at 273. The concept of proximate cause is
used to evaluate the foreseeability or directness of the connection between negligence and the type
of injury that results. The strength of that connection turns on such factors as proximity in time
and place. See generally id. at 273-74 (setting forth five characteristics of proximate cause).
142. For example, in Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner disagreed over the
adequacy of the damages recoverable for accidental death resulting from a city fire dispatcher's
tortious conduct. According to Judge Easterbrook, the State of Wisconsin had chosen through the
"democratic process" to "offer full tort compensation" in the amount of $50,000, but the plaintiffs'
desire to recover more money for the death of their mother brought them to federal court, where
"[s]ection 1983 is not. . . a source of authority for federal courts to revise the structural choices
any government must make." Id. at 1224. Judge Posner found the State of Wisconsin to be "open
to criticism" for setting an arbitrary ceiling on damages awarded for torts committed by its state
and local agencies and employees. When state citizens rely on the availability of competent rescue
services, but "the provision of those services falls far below minimum levels of competence the
state ought to be answerable in damages, if not to the same extent that a private provider of such
services would be then at least to a greater extent than Wisconsin law allows." Id. at 1227 (Posner,
J., concurring). Nevertheless, Judge Posner concluded that "[Wisconsin's limit on damages] merely
exerts pressure to recharacterize common law tort suits as federal constitutional tort suits, and I
doubt whether it is in the long-run best interests of the State of Wisconsin to encourage the feder-
alization of its public-employee tort law." Id.
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amendment to discriminate against the rights attendant to national cit-
izenship and to frustrate enforcement of fundamental rights somehow
may be counterbalanced adequately in the post-fourteenth amendment
world through the political accountability of state elected officials. The
DeShaney Court increased the states' latitude to impose affirmative du-
ties upon themselves at the expense of the federal courts' authority to
protect arguably fundamental interests.14 Such a decision, which logi-
cally proceeds from Slaughter-House, makes sense only if the Court: (1)
declines to read into the equal protection and due process clauses the
protections the framers intended to be included in the privileges or im-
munities clause, (2) confines the broadly intended protections of the
fourteenth amendment only to racial discrimination, or (3) believes that
in today's world majoritarian hostility to fundamental personal inter-
ests only rarely merits federal concern.14 4
Any historiographical analysis of the fourteenth amendment is in-
complete, however, without explaining the significance of the fifth sec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to pass
legislation to effectuate it. 145 Proponents of a negative rights view of the
Constitution have difficulty reconciling the fifth section of the four-
teenth amendment with their view in light of the ample evidence that
the framers of the Civil War Amendments "meant them to serve as a
basis for a positive, comprehensive federal program-a program defin-
ing fundamental civil rights protected by federal machinery against
both state and private encroachment.' 46 The hearings on the four-
teenth amendment reflect an acute awareness of "private invasions of
civil liberties:"
These factors were ... clearly in the minds of the committee members when they
drafted the all-important first section of the fourteenth amendment. The demon-
strated fact that violations of civil rights were primarily the product of individual
rather than state action made it unreasonable for the committee to limit the scope
of the amendment to state action.147
Unfortunately, as early as the Civil Rights Cases 4a and in the same
143. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989).
144. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[o]ne wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination-or,
more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even re-
members that it ever was").
145. See supra notes 27 & 76.
146. R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 36 (1947) (emphasis
added).
147. Gressman, supra note 43, at 1329-30.
148. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Although the Civil Rights Cases frequently are credited with originat-
ing the state action requirement, see, e.g., Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State
Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantees, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 855 (1966), the Court
already had laid the groundwork in two cases. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)
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spirit as Slaughter-House, the Court read section 5 as "not
authoriz[ing] Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regula-
tion of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the oper-
ation of State laws, and the action of State officers ... ."149
Nevertheless, Congress has used its authority under section 5 to
pass legislation designed to correct conditions that Congress has found
constitute violations of the fourteenth amendment, including far-reach-
ing amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,150 affirmative action
measures to allow for greater employment by minorities in federal con-
tracting, 5' and prohibitions against conspiracies to deprive citizens of
rights protected by the Constitution.'52 The decisions upholding con-
(declaring that "[t]he provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . all have reference to State
action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals"); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875) (declaring that "[t]he fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from deny-
ing to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does
not ... add any thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against
another").
149. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Prior to the fourteenth
amendment, state common law safeguarded fundamental rights from private infringements, and
the Bill of Rights ensured that the national government would be constrained by the same natural
law principles that already limited private action. The fourteenth amendment and the civil rights
statutes enacted to effectuate its guarantees were designed to limit the freedom of the states to
continue to develop common law in ways that allowed private violence against fundamental liber-
ties to thrive. Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases depended in part on
the Court's belief that state common law still protected fundamental rights against private in-
fringements. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 511-16. Section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment was designed, however, as a tool to enable "Congress, in case the States shall enact
laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal con-
gressional enactment." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard); see also supra notes 76 & 126.
150. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (relying on Congress's authority under §
5 of the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation to enforce the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court held Congress may restrict literacy requirements to enforce non-
discriminatory treatment by the government and, therefore, amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965
to include § 4(e), which allowed citizens of New York primarily from Puerto Rico to vote even
though they could not read English). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding,
partially on the basis of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, legislation establishing 18 as the na-
tional voting age, nationwide restrictions on literacy tests, and changes in state residency require-
ments for federal elections, but a majority rejected Congress's authority under § 5 to establish 18
as the minimum voting age in state elections).
151. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a
federal set-aside program to increase minority participation in government contracting as being
authorized by Congress's special powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (striking down specific city set-asides for mi-
nority business enterprises to remedy past discrimination, while distinguishing Congress's similar
program as being authorized by Congress's unique powers under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment).
152. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (upholding an indictment for criminal conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 241,
with six Justices joining one or the other of two concurring opinions declaring that Congress pos-
sessed the power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment "to enact laws punishing all conspiracies
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gressional intrusions on state activities may be defended as an ordinary
application of the general proposition 153 that the federal courts will not
enforce limitations on congressional power based on federalism because
the political restraints on Congress are sufficient to protect states
against hostile national action.154. As Professor Archibald Cox has ob-
served, "Congress, in the field of state activities and except as confined
by the Bill of Rights, has the power to enact any law which may be
viewed as a measure for correction of any condition which Congress
might believe involves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amend-
ment rights."' 5 5 The Court has used similar reasoning to uphold con-
gressional actions under the other Reconstruction Amendments. 156
Perhaps no other statute enacted by Congress pursuant to section 5
of the fourteenth amendment has created more concerns about federal-
ism than section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.157 Passed at
a time when both the newly freed slaves and their supporters were be-
ing terrorized by such groups as the Ku Klux Klan, often with state
knowledge, indifference, or even participation, section 1983 imposed
damages on any "person"-defined to include "bodies politic and cor-
to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth amendment rights, whether or not state officers or
others acting under color of state law are implicated in the conspiracy"); see also id. at 762 (Clark,
J., concurring).
153. See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954); see also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
154. See Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27
STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
155. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966).
156. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (reaffirming City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (finding that Congress had the power under § 2 of the
fifteenth amendment to prohibit certain electoral changes and annexations even though they were
not intentionally discriminatory); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of Congress's enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 pursuant to its powers under § 2 of the
thirteenth amendment to provide a cause of action against private discrimination in the enforce-
ment and making of contracts); and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, enacted by Congress
pursuant to the powers granted to it by § 2 of the fifteenth amendment)); see also EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding the extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which Congress had enacted under its commerce clause powers, to apply to state and local govern-
ments as well as private action).
157. Section 1983 codifies the Act of Apr. 20, 1871, supra note 15, § 1, 17 Stat. at 13 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). It provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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porate"' 5 S-depriving a citizen of the United States of his or her consti-
tutional rights.1 59 Section 1983 was a key part of a package of statutes
that expressed in no uncertain terms Congress's distrust of the states'
propensity to protect fully and fairly the fundamental rights of individ-
uals rendered powerless in the face of state or private infringements of
fundamental rights.160
Much of the same attitude the Slaughter-House Court exhibited
toward the fourteenth amendment has carried over to the Court's inter-
pretation of section 1983. Almost as soon as it was passed, section 1983
was rendered virtually dormant by a Court hostile to Reconstruction
and suspicious of the impact of section 1983 on state autonomy. The
Court's narrow reading of the privileges or immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Slaughter-House and the subsequently stiff
requirement that the federal courts and Congress could enforce the
fourteenth amendment only against state, as opposed to private, action
"devastat[ed]" section 1983 throughout much of its first century of ex-
istence. 61 During the past thirty years, however, "federalists" and "na-
tionalists" on the Court have tried to fashion a special body of federal
common law under section 1983 that balances the interests of the states
to preserve their own autonomy against the interests of individuals
seeking enforcement of their fundamental rights in federal court.162
This balance is being pushed increasingly in favor of the states.16 1 In-
158. The Dictionary Act of 1871 provided that the term "'person' may extend and be ap-
plied to bodies politic and corporate." See Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431
(repealed 1939); accord Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978).
159. See generally P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 874-83 (1987) (suggesting the purposes of § 1983 may include compensation, deterrence,
and affirmation of constitutional rights); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 47-56
(1980) (referring to the purposes of § 1983 as deterrence, affirmation of constitutional rights, pun-
ishment, and compensation); see also Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,
supra note 136 (examining the background and limits to § 1983 in the context of federalism and
civil rights lawsuits under this statute).
160. See Logan, supra note 11, at 505-10.
161. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 136, at 1161. For
example, in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court struck down in part the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to prohibit racial discrimination by
private parties providing public accommodations. Several courts interpreted this decision to mean
that states' officers' conduct in violation of a state law was not state action and, thus, was not
culpable conduct under § 1983. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,
supra note 136, at 1159-61. As a result of such decisions, § 1983 remained dormant until the Court
held in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that actions against municipal officials in
their personal capacities may be brought under § 1983.
162. For a description of how the Court developed a special body of federal common law on
governmental liability in a long and complicated series of decisions focusing on the interplay be-
tween the immunities against damages in federal court granted by the eleventh amendment, direc-
tives contained in the fourteenth amendment, and grants of jurisdiction provided by § 1983, see
Gerhardt, supra note 129.
163. See Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 5
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deed, during the 1988 Term, the Court decided two cases, City of Can-
ton v. Harris"'4 and Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,'65 in
which the "federalists" succeeded in securing even greater state auton-
omy and immunity from damages under section 1983.166
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911 (1979). Judge James Oakes argued that the Court seriously has limited § 1983
in the following four ways:
[(1) designating] certain acts by state officials [as not] ris[ing] to the level of constitutional
violations and therefore [as] not trigger[ing] federal remedial relief. . . . [(2) Making] avai-
lab[le] to public officials [the defenses of] immunity, good faith, and lack-of-intent. . ., at
least when the officials are acting within the scope of their authority. . . . [(3) Limiting] re-
covery . . . only for actual, compensable injuries . . . in a manner patterned after, if not
exactly paralleling, the common law of torts .... [(4) Taking federalism concerns into ac-
count in order to recognize the] eleventh amendment immunity of states from damage awards
[and to issue] a series of decisions limiting the availability of federal injunctive relief in ongo-
ing state proceedings.
Id. at 941-44 (citations omitted).
164. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (unanimously holding that there may be municipal liability under
§ 1983 for a policy of inadequate police training if the appropriate decision makers within a munic-
ipality deliberately intended or exhibited deliberate indifference with respect to the constitutional
rights of citizens in designing a training program for its police officers).
165. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (holding 5-4 that neither the states nor state officials in their
official capacities are persons for purposes of § 1983 actions in either federal or state court).
166. The significance of both City of Canton and Will cannot be overstated. First, in City of
Canton, the Court unanimously agreed to perpetuate the balance that the Monell Court had con-
structed between making municipalities accountable in federal court for their constitutional viola-
tions but limiting the damages against them to official policies or customs to commit constitutional
deprivations. This balance is significant because, in the Court's words:
To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented
liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitu-
tional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something
the city "could have done" to prevent the unfortunate incident. . . . Thus, permitting cases
against cities for their "failure to train" employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser
standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities-a
result we rejected in Monell. . . . It would also engage the federal courts in an endless exer-
cise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe
the federal courts are ill-suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious ques-
tions of federalism.
City of Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1206 (citations omitted).
There are two reasons the implications of Will are even more enormous than City of Canton.
First, because the Court's construction of § 1983 applies to such actions in both federal and state
courts, Will extends the concerns about the immunity of the states from damages in federal court,
controlled by the eleventh amendment, to the state courts, where the eleventh amendment does
not apply. The result is, as Justice William Brennan explained in dissent, that the states "may not
be sued under that statute regardless of whether they have consented to suit." Will, 109 S. Ct. at
2319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, even more perniciously, the Court rewrites the purposes
underlying § 1983. The Court applies to Will the presumption it has used in other cases that
Congress may abrogate the immunity the states enjoy from damages in federal court under the
eleventh amendment only if Congress expresses its intent clearly and unmistakably. Id. at 2309.
The concern for the states underlying the presumption is misplaced. The legislative history of §
1983, as well as the plain language and understanding underlying the Dictionary Act of 1871 to
define the term "person" in § 1983 to include both state and municipal governments, demonstrate
Congress already had the states' interest in mind when Congress decided to subject the states to
damage actions in federal court through § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 357-65 (1979)
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Even less defense exists for the Court's crabbed reading of section
1983 than for the Slaughter-House Court's restrictive reading of the
fourteenth amendment. It is understandable that the Court might be
hesitant to read the Constitution broadly given that the Court fre-
quently is, in the absence of a constitutional amendment, the last word
on the scope and meaning of the Constitution. The Court, however,
need not have hesitated to read section 1983 broadly because Congress
could have intervened at any time to correct a mistaken interpretation.
Indeed, as a quasi-constitutional statute, section 1983 is entitled to a
broad reading to effectuate its protections.167 Nevertheless, the Court
has preferred to frustrate routinely the will of the Congress that passed
section 1983 even though that Congress already had expressed its dis-
trust of the states. This situation is particularly ironic because in the
past term the Court publicly has denounced judicial activism while, at
the same time, it actively has restricted the scope of significant Recon-
struction civil rights statutes, including section 1983.168
(Brennan, J., dissenting), quoted in Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Will Court declined to adopt Justice Brennan's reading of the legislative history of § 1983
because it was not sufficiently clear to them that Congress intended to abrogate the states' elev-
enth amendment immunity in this area. The history of Reconstruction, however, demonstrates
that Congress held the states responsible for the violence in 1871 against the newly freed slaves
and their supporters and, therefore, made the states the primary target of § 1983. See Gerhardt,
supra note 129, at 561-62; Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the
Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 765-75, 783, 793 (1987); Nowak, supra note 16, at
1464-68 (acknowledging that Congress could, if it so desired, make states liable for damage actions
under the fourteenth amendment, but that the drafters of § 1983 did not intend such a result even
though they frequently referred to "states" throughout the congressional discussion of § 1983);
Oakes, supra note 163, at 943-44; Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits: Reexamining
Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REV. 731 (1982) (separating the issue whether states are persons for
purposes of § 1983 liability from the issue whether states are entitled to eleventh amendment
immunity arguably abrogated by § 1983 and concluding that states are persons for purposes of §
1983 liability but there is not sufficient historical evidence to satisfy the standard necessary for
abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity in federal court).
167. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 622 n.49 (1981); Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 249, 265; Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analysis
in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1301, 1311-12 (1978); cf. Logan, supra note
11, at 457 n.13.
168. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989) (refusing to hold
governments liable on a respondeat superior basis under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and limiting the scope
of governmental liability under that statute to any governmental policies or customs of racial dis-
crimination in the formation and enforcement of contracts even though the statute, unlike 42
U.S.C. § 1983, contains no "policy" or "custom" requirement on its face); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (limiting the prohibitions in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to apply not to
private racial harassment in the performance of a contract but only to the actual negotiation of or
enforcement in a court of a particular contract); Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2304 (basing its holding that
states are not persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in part on its conclusory assertion that the
legislative history of the statute was not sufficiently clear to subject the states to such liability as
required by previous court decisions); see also Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989)
448
1990] SLAUGHTER-HOUSE 449
Despite charges that the Court has engaged in "lawmaking"' 69 to
protect the states under section 1983, Congress never has corrected the
Court's reading of section 1983. The Court's failure to take an extreme
view of section 1983, such as holding states and their political subdivi-
sions as completely immune from section 1983 liability or as being lia-
ble on a respondeat superior basis under section 1983, has made it less
likely that Congress would react in any way.170 The irony of the Court's
taking an extreme view of section 1983, however, would have been that
it may have forced the states to pursue a remedy in the federal political
process, precisely what the framers of the fourteenth amendment
wanted. 171
III. CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to demonstrate the consequences of the
Court's wrong decision in Slaughter-House for a modern understanding
and appreciation of the fourteenth amendment. In Slaughter-House the
grandest ambitions of the framers of the fourteenth amendment were
lost, including the amendment's privileges or immunities clause, the
most natural textual home for affirmative duties and unenumerated
fundamental rights.1 2 If these ambitions remain lost, however, the
(agreeing to review whether a fired employee whose claim was denied under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also is barred from prevailing under the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
169. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 487 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (maintaining that the Court has ignored the legislative his-
tory of § 1983 to take federalism concerns into account in construing the statute).
170. No doubt, the Will Court's construction of § 1983 as excluding the states as possible
defendants is extreme, but there are two reasons that this holding at such a late date in the stat-
ute's development would not prompt Congress to act. First, the reasons for subjecting the states to
such liability in contemporary America may be critical but probably are not as compelling as they
were when the statute was enacted originally in 1871. Second, the unlikelihood of Congress's
amending the Will Court's reading of § 1983 suggests something significant about the power of the
states to protect themselves in the federal political process. It is a good guess that the states re-
main both ready and powerful enough to block any group from lobbying Congress to amend § 1983
to overrule Will.
171. See supra notes 153-55; see also Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected". The Role of
Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1193 n.23 (1988).
172. The other natural textual home for unenumerated fundamental rights in the Constitu-
tion is the ninth amendment. See supra note 22. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court only thrice has
made reference to the ninth amendment as a potential source of unenumerated rights. See Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980) (noting that "Madison's efforts,
culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that
expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (stating that "[tihis right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . ., or . . .in the Ninth Amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("emphasiz[ing] the relevance of [the Ninth] Amendment" to the exis-
tence of a constitutionally protected right of privacy).
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Court cannot be held solely responsible. The Congress must take its fair
share of blame for having failed to legislate broadly against state or
private infringements of fundamental rights made more likely as the
result of the Court's ruling.
During the 1988 Term, the Court's perpetuation of the world view
expressed in Slaughter-House has extended two challenges at the ex-
pense of a more vigilant federal judiciary. First, the Court has chal-
lenged Congress to amend as precisely as possible the Reconstruction
civil rights statutes to reflect the broad coverage Congress desires. This
accomplishment is no small feat because, in making the challenge, the
Court has exhibited a willingness to narrow the broad language of such
statutes to their literal confines or to disregard their broad language
when the legislative histories of the statutes reflect specific social
problems giving rise to their passage. Second, the Court has challenged
the states to do their fair share in protecting and preserving personal
interests through a new, or at least a revived, understanding of political
accountability. Now that the gauntlets have been flung down, it remains
for both Congress and the states to pick them up.
Although this Essay has argued that the Constitution contains textual bases that protect cer-
tain unenumerated fundamental rights, this Essay does not purport to discuss fully the process by
which the substantive content of those rights is determined. That rather formidable task must be
deferred to another day.
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